Security researcher Niyikiza has published analysis examining how AI agents conceptual model of their tools differs dangerously from actual tool capabilities, creating exploitable trust boundary gaps. The research draws on the philosophical principle that the map is not the territory to illustrate how agent understanding of tool behavior creates security vulnerabilities.

AI agents operate based on tool descriptions provided during configuration. These descriptions represent the map that agents use to understand available capabilities. However, actual tool implementations represent the territory with behaviors that may exceed, differ from, or contradict their descriptions. Attackers exploit gaps between agent expectations and tool reality.

The research demonstrates scenarios where tools perform actions beyond their documented scope. A file reading tool might follow symbolic links to access unintended locations. A database query tool might accept commands that modify data despite being described as read-only. Agents trusting tool descriptions cannot anticipate these capability overflows.

Conversely, agents may believe they have protections that tools do not actually implement. Descriptions claiming input validation or access controls may not reflect actual tool behavior. Agents making security-relevant decisions based on assumed protections operate with false confidence that attackers can exploit.

Niyikiza recommends implementing defense in depth that assumes tools may behave unexpectedly, auditing tool implementations against their descriptions, and treating tool descriptions as potentially inaccurate rather than authoritative. Organizations should conduct security reviews that examine actual tool behavior rather than relying on documentation, and implement monitoring that detects tool actions exceeding documented capabilities.